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small to satisfy the sixth and fourteenth amendments' guarantee of a right to trial by jury, the remaining seven justices
declined to base their decisions on incipient social science data.
Mr. Justice White concurred in the judgment because he
agreed that a jury of less than six persons would fail to represent the sense of the community and thus fail to achieve a fair
cross-section of the community. Justice Powell, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, concurred in the judgment but noted that Justice Blackmun's heavy reliance on
numerology was unwarranted. Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by
Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall, argued that while
the sixth and fourteenth amendments mandate juries in
criminal cases with more than five members, Ballew should not
be subjected to a new trial since the Georgia law was "overbroad and therefore facially unconstitutional." Id., at 246.
In conclusion, the Court felt that juries with six or more
members represent a fair cross-section of the community,
promote unbiased decision- making, and thus safeguard the
constitutional guarantees of the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
In passing it should be mentioned that in Maryland, the Maryland Declaration of Rights 3 grants to the accused the right to
juror unanimity in criminal trials. However, the defendant, with
the court's consent and the prosecutor's consent, may waive
unanimity. 4 Concomitantly, Maryland Rule 751 states that in
criminal trials the parties may stipulate to a jury of less than
twelve members. Although the Supreme Court has sanctioned
less than unanimous verdicts with twelve member juries, the
Court will eventually have to address the issue of unanimity for
juries with less than twelve members.
-J. Michael Dougherty, Jr.
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3MD. DEC. OF RIGHTS art. 21.
4State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 375 A. 2d.228 (1977). See, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 130
(1977).

The Press v.
The Prosecution
Constitutional struggle between the government and the
press is not a novel phenomenon. The interests of the two often
conflict and as a result of a recent Supreme Court decision, the
friction seems likely to continue. In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978), the Justices were confronted with the
question of whether the government, pursuant to a search
warrant, may constitutionally seize evidence from a newspaper
when the paper is not suspected of criminal activity.
The Supreme Court decided that a newspaper unsuspected
of involvement in a crime cannot automatically and absolutely
claim immunity from a search warrant for evidence related to
that same crime. By a vote of 5-3, Justice Brennan not
participating, the Court held that when a place to be searched
is occupied by a person not then a suspect, a warrant to search
for evidence reasonably believed to be present can be issued
despite the absence of unusual circumstances. The essential
element is the reasonable cause to believe that the objects to be
sought are indeed present on the premises into which entry is
made.
This decision affirmed Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F2d.
464 (9th Cir. 1977), which required the existence of probable
cause to believe that the owner of the property to be searched
would have disregarded the court order not to remove or
destroy evidence as a basis for issuance of the search warrant.
Both the Court of Appeals and the District Court, 353 F.Supp.
124 (N.D. Cal. 1972) emphasized the absence of suspected
criminal involvement on the part of the newspaper reporter. In
such a case, probable cause to think that evidence of a crime is
located on the property is not alone sufficient to justify the
issuance of a warrant; a threat concerning the removal or destruction of evidence must be clearly shown.
On Friday, April 9, 1971, a student demonstration was held
at the Stanford University Hospital and culminated in the
demonstrators' forcible occupation of the administrative
offices. The police departments of the City of Palo Alto and
Santa Clara County were called to remove the students. After
several attempts were made to persuade the demonstrators to
leave peacefully, the police broke through one of the barricades that had been erected by the protestors at both the east
and west ends of the corridor adjacent to the administrative
offices. As the police moved through the west end, the
protestors emerged from the east end with sticks and attacked
the police stationed there. All nine of the policemen were
injured.
A photographer for the Stanford Daily News was also
located at the east end of the corridor. On April 11, the
Stanford Daily carried a story about the demonstration,
complete with pictures and a byline of a Daily staff member. On
April 12, the District Attorney for Santa Clara County secured
a warrant for the immediate search of the Daily offices for negatives, film and pictures of the April 9th event. The District Attorney claimed that he had justifiable, reasonable and probable
cause to believe that he could locate evidence relevant to the
identity of the individuals who attacked the Hospital's administrative offices. The search included the photo lab, filing
cabinets, desks and waste paper baskets but excluded locked
drawers and rooms. Notes were read and photos were found
but nothing was removed.
The Stanford Daily News argued that the actions
nevertheless threatened its ability to gather, analyze, and disseminate news. Specifically, the Daily alleged that the search
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would now impede publication, deplete confidential sources,
discourage reporters from preserving written recollections,
chill news dissemination and result in press self-censorship. If
records could easily be seized, fewer people would cooperate
with the press, less information would be sought and therefore,
less would be printed.
Essentually, the Daily contended that the warrant stifled its
freedom of expression and the stringent standards of the
fourteenth amendment should be applied with scrupulous
exactitude when materials protected by the first amendment
are involved. The Daily sought declaratory and injunctive relief
under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Daily successfully contended
at the District Court level that the police conducting the
search, the Police Chief, the District Attorney, his Deputy and
the judge issuing the warrant violated the Daily's constitutional
rights under the first, fourth and fourteenth amendments.
The fourth amendment applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment, provides that "[T]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized." In order to insure the reasonableness of the search and
seizure and the validity of the warrant, the standard of probable
cause is a reasonable belief that a) a crime has been committed
and b) that relevant evidence connected with the crime may be
found on the premises into which entry is sought. This
"relevant evidence" includes the fruits or instrumentalities of
crime or property constituting evidence of the crime itself.
However, the fourth amendment does not expressly state
anything about the exclusion of warrants to search the premises of third parties nor does it require the existence of
probable cause to believe that a third party be implicated in the
crime.
In Zurcher, the Supreme court chose not to read these requirements into the fourth amendment and decided that the
law protects against general intrusions and requires that the
search be reasonable, specific in purpose, based upon prob
able cause and approved by a neutral magistrate. Such a
neutral magistrate can protect against searches unreasonable
in scope.
The Supreme Court felt that no justification existed for
further encroachment upon the prosecutorial process. The
Justices reached this conclusion after balancing the interest in
protecting first amendment freedoms against the interest of
ensuring the successful prosecution of the guilty defendants.
This balancing process exemplifies a struggle that initially
started between the Crown and the press and which
constituted the impetus for the eventual enactment of the
fourth amendment. In the instant case, the Court supported
the government's interest in enforcing the criminal laws and recovering evidence.
The Daily argued that this interest is offset in certain circumstances. Most importantly, the Daily contended that in a
situation where the basic probable cause is not met, additional
requirements such as the initial use of a subpoena should be
imposed.
The Court, however, answered this contention by
emphasizing that a delay in responding to a subpoena duces
tecum could result in the disappearance of evidence. During
the investigatory stage and prior to an indictment, the prosecution cannot be sure that a third party is innocent or is not
aligned with the defendant. Only a warrant can expedite the
successful prosecution of a guilty party by providing access to

evidence instrumental to a conviction. At the same time, only
the higher stringent standard for evaluating the validity of a
warrant was viewed by the Court as a better protection against
an unjustifiable invasion of privacy. The Daily believed that the
better protection is afforded by requiring a subpoena
proceeding involving notice and a hearing.
In his concurring opinion, Judge Powell joined with the court
in denying any relief to the Daily and condemned Justice
Stewart's view that in the case of a newspaper, the search
without a warrant is unreasonable if a subpoena may be obtained as a substitute procedure. Justice Powell felt that if the
framers of the fourth amendment had intended to create a
special exception for the press, they would have done so.
Justices Stewart and Marshall, dissenting, felt that the
search conducted in the case definitely infringed upon the
Daily's first amendment right. Although they agreed with the
majority that the validity of the search had nothing to do with
the subject of the search as a suspect, they nevertheless argued
that such a search significantly disrupted the newspaper's
operation.
Stewart and Marshall state that a subpoena would give a
newspaper time to locate the requested material. Assuming the
newspaper is not implicated in the crime and there are no
exigent circumstances, the Justices argued that the newspaper should be given the opportunity to respond before a
search warrant is issued. Once a search has been conducted,
the invasion of constitutional liberties has occured and it is too
late to challenge the basis for issuance of the warrant.
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In addition, Stewart and Marshall recognized the dangers in
compelling disclosure of confidential news sources. Informants
have been essential to the gathering of information and ultimate
dissemination of news of public interest. Warrants could force
reporters to reveal the identity of these sources even though
they may be unrelated to the evidence sought. Future sources
of important-but secret information, fearful of having their
identity revealed, may be reluctant to confide in the press.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens discussed
another dimension of the case. He emphasized the private
nature of the evidence sought and questioned the sufficiency of
the reasonable belief standard when the police make an
unannounced search of property belonging to a non-suspect.
Since the warrant clause of the fourth amendment was not
framed to protect private papers and at the same time does not
define probable cause, Stevens stressed the need to distinguish
between evidence of a personal nature and instruments of a
crime. He recognized that there should be probable cause that
the defendant committed a crime and that the defendant is
likely to destroy any evidence related to it. If a lower probable
cause standard is employed and personal matters are seized,
reputations could be injured and privacy invaded. Only the
subpoena process affords a prior opportunity to challenge the
search and therefore, to prevent access to private materials.
However, the majority did not agree that a subpoena procedure should be required where an unannounced search is
conducted on the property of a newspaper not suspected of
committing a crime. A warrant is not barred in such a case and
a special exemption from searches and seizures for the press
was rejected.
-Charles Chester

A Suit of Armor
On March 28, 1978 the Supreme Court reinforced the common law principle of judicial immunity from civil suit. In a 5-3
decision the Court in Stump u. Sparkman, 98 S.Ct. 1099
(1978), concluded that an Indiana Circuit Court judge who authorized the sterilization of a fifteen year old girl in an ex parte
proceeding, was immune from civil suit under 42 U.S.C.§1983.
The circumstances preceding the application of the doctrine
are shocking. In 1975 Linda and Leo Sparkman sought medical
advice as to why they could not conceive a child. At this point
Linda Spitler Sparkman first learned that she had been
sterilized at the age of fifteen. Her mother, Ora Spitler
McFarlin, had petitioned the Circuit Court of DeKalb County,
Indiana to order the sterilization of her daughter. Mrs. McFarlin had alleged that without her knowledge and consent, her
daughter, Linda, dated and stayed overnight with various
young men. Mrs. McFarlin directed her attorney, Warren G.
Sunday, to prepare an affidavit which stated that "Linda was
,somewhat retarded' although she attended public schools and
had been passed along with other children in her age level."
Sparkman v. McFarlin 552 F.2d 172, 173 (7th Cir. 1977). The
petition and affidavit were presented to Judge Stump of the Circuit Court who issued the requested order without appointing
a guardian ad litem to represent Linda's interests, without
holding an evidentiary hearing, without providing Linda with
notice of the petition, and without even filing the order in the
DeKalb County Circuit Court. The only "notice" Linda

received during this period of time was that she was to enter the
hospital for an appendectomy.
Linda and Leo Sparkman brought an action seeking
damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985 (3) contending
that the actions of the defendants, Ora E. McFarlin, Warren G.
Sunday, Esq., Dr. John Hines, and Judge Harold Stump, violated her constitutional rights by sterilizing her or causing her
to be sterilized. Pendent state claims were attached for assault
and battery and medical malpractice. Leo Sparkman asserted a
pendent claim for loss of potential fatherhood. The District
Court, in granting the defendants' motions to dismiss, held that
no federal action would lie against any of the defendants
because Judge Stump, the only state agent, was absolutely immune from suit pursuant to the doctrine of judicial immunity.
Sparkman u. McFarlin, Civil No. F 75-129 (N.D. Ind. May 13,
1976). "Whether or not Judge Stump's approval of the petition
may in retrospect appear to have been premised on an erroneous view of the law, Judge Stump surely had jurisdiction to
consider the petition and act thereon." 98 S.Ct. at 1104.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the judgment of the Circuit Court and held that Judge Stump
failed to act within his jurisdiction when he approved the petition to have Linda Spitler sterilized. The Court reasoned that
although IND. CODE 33-4-4-3 confers original jurisdiction in all
cases of law and equity, it does not cloak a Circuit Court judge
with blanket immunity. The Court found that there was no statutory basis for Judge Stump's approval of the petition. In addition, Judge Stump was acting unlawfully even if he was creating an innovative legal remedy to meet changing social conditions, an argument made in support of the broad discretion
exerciseable by a judge. A judge may not use his judicial power
"to order extreme irreversible remedies such as sterilization in
situations where the legislative branch of government has indicated that they are inappropriate." 552 F.2d at 176.
Of significance is the fact that the Court of Appeals found the
actions taken to be an illegitimate exercise of judicial common
law power due to failure to comply with elementary principles
of procedural due process. 552 F.2d at 176.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and found that Judge Stump was immune from liability
for damages even if his approval of the petition for sterilization
was in error. The concepts of jurisdiction and the judicial act
requirements were found to be determinative of the extent of
the doctrine of judicial immunity. The Court noted that the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals misconstrued the doctrine.
Because Judge Stump had performed a judicial act that was not
in clear absence of all jurisdiction, he was thus entitled to judicial immunity. 98 S.Ct.at 1106.
The Supreme court examined the statutory authority vested
in an Indiana Circuit Court Judge pursuant to IND.CODE33-44-3 (1976), which states:
Said Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases at law
and in equity whatsoever and in criminal cases and actions
for divorce, except where exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction is, or may be conferred by law upon other justices of the
peace...
Formerly, Indiana Circuit Court judges had the authority to authorize sterilization but only upon institutionalized persons.
Ch. 227, §1, 1951 Indiana Act 649; Chap. 244, §§1-3, 1937
Indiana Acts 1164; Chap. 312, §§2-6, 1931 Indiana Acts 116;
Chap. 241, §§1-6, 1927 Indiana Acts 713 (repealed 1974). The
Supreme Court did not consider it significant that the authority
to sterilize had been repealed. What was significant, however,

